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Abstract
Recent reforms to the provision of welfare services by the public sector have
transferred control rights in production from politicians to managers and
simultaneously introduced competition between public sector suppliers. We
derive conditions under which a self-interested politician will introduce either
competition and/or managerial control for services where quality matters.
We show that both competition and managerial control give incentives for
greater managerial effort. However the cost of competition is higher taxes
and the cost of decentralisation is a loss of political benefits. The politician
will introduce these reforms if the political benefits from higher value service
outweigh these costs.
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1 Introduction
Privatisation is not the only way governments have sought to increase the
efficiency of the public sector. Politicians have also attempted reform within
government, particularly of state-provided welfare services such as health
care, housing and education. One model is the creation of a separate agency
within government whose sole task is to administrate a single, clearly defined
program. A more radical option, recently pursued by several governments,
is the devolution of decision making to local level coupled with the creation
of competing provider organisations within the public sector.
Analysis of reforms that allow competition within the state sector is of
considerable interest. This type of reform has been widely adopted in the
UK welfare state, where it known as ’quasi-market’ reform (Le Grand 1991),
and it is not uncommon in the US, where it is referred to as an ’internal
market’ and is a model that has received considerable interest from other
governments who both engage in the provision and funding of welfare services.
Examples in UK include the quasi-market reforms in health care, education,
social services, and social rented housing. Examples elsewhere are primarily
reform of the provision of health care. These quasi-market reforms combine
tax finance of (and in many cases, universal entitlement to) a service with
competition between publicly financed suppliers.
Privatisation can be defined as a combination of the reallocation of con-
trol rights from politicians to managers (corporatisation) and an increase in
cash-flow ownership of managers and private investors (Boycko et al 1996
and Shleifer and Vishny 1994). Privatised enterprises may operate in mar-
kets with or without competition. The reforms of publicly provided welfare
services such as health care and education can be similarly classified accord-
ing to whether control rights are transferred from politicians to managers,
whether there is change of ownership of cash flows, and whether there is
competition in supply. In the cases of an agency or competition between
suppliers who are within the public sector, managers are given greater con-
trol rights but ownership of cash flows remains with the government. These
reforms are therefore the equivalent of corporatisation. The two cases differ
in that in the latter multiple agencies are created to fulfill the task and are
intended to compete with each other. Where government privatises the ser-
vices (for example, in the case of prisons in some US states and in the UK)
there is change in ownership of cash flows on top of transfer of control rights
to managers and competition (either for the contract or in supply).
1
Page 4 of 28 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
This paper analyses the conditions under which a self-interested politician
would introduce competition within suppliers located in the public sector
(i.e. would introduce quasi-market reforms). We separate the dimensions
of control rights and competition in supply. Control rights may be given
to managers or retained by politicians. Competition may or may not be
introduced. We assume universal entitlement and focus on the impact of
such reforms on the quality of the service.
We assume competition on the supply side is characterised by small num-
bers, reflecting the local nature of public services. We determine which form
of production a self-interested politician would choose using an incomplete
contracting approach. The politician designs the organisation of public ser-
vices to maximise his own utility. He derives a political benefit from high-
value service since voters like it, but has to raise taxes to pay for it, which
voters do not like. We assume the manager derives private benefits from ser-
vice production, but these are lower when she does not have control rights.
We show that the politician can use the instruments of managerial con-
trol and competition to elicit greater managerial effort and, hence, higher
quality of public services. However, manageri l control and higher quality
come at a cost: the first brings a loss of political benefits, the second higher
tax revenues. The politician will choose competition when he derives benefit
from a high-value service and when cost of raising taxes is not too high. He
will delegate control rights if the effort level that can be implemented un-
der managerial control is sufficiently greater than under politician control,
outweighing the loss of political benefit to him of being fully in charge of
the service. In the choice of organisational form, there is a trade-off between
popularity of the service being provided and the relative private benefit that
the manager and politician get respectively from being seen as associated
with the service. Our analysis also shows that delegation is not always op-
timal when the supplier gets more private benefit from service provision,
and competition may be introduced even when managers have strong private
incentives to supply high quality services.
Our paper follows the literature on privatisation by focusing on the issues
of control rights and competition. Boycko et al (1996), Hart et al (1997), and
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) have used an incomplete contracting approach
to analyse privatisation, and it has been suggested that this would be a
fruitful way to look at government organisation (Tirole (1994)). We allow
for an explicit role for the politician in choosing the form that service delivery
should take. Recent literature on public services has examined the role of
2
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agent motivation (e.g. Besley and Ghatak 2005) and Francois 2000) and
in keeping with this literature we assume that both service providers and
politicians get non-monetary benefits from service provision.
The organisation of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the
institutional details of one particular set of quasi-market reforms: those in
the UK. In Section 3 we present the model. In Section 4 we analyse the
various organisational forms. Section 5 examines the forces determining the
optimal organisation. Section 6 examines the sensitivity of the results to a
change in key parameters. The final section discusses the applicability of the
model.
2 The Institutional Details: the UK Quasi-
Market Reforms
Prior to the late 1980s the in-kind benefits, health care, education, social
services and social rented housing, of the UK (and other European welfare
states) were funded through taxation and delivered by service providers who
were part of either a central or a local government department. Each service
provider was responsible for all services delivered in a local region. Service
users had little choice of provider. Standards for provision (mainly in terms
of inputs) were determined by the central government ministry responsible
for provision of the service (sometimes with some local political control).
Such arrangements were criticised for being unresponsive to users, and
inefficient and different models of service delivery were sought. One model
was to contract out services completely to private providers (Szymanski and
Bello 1996). Another was to introduce competition on the supply side within
the public sector whilst maintaining tax finance. These so-called ’quasi-
market’ reforms maintained tax finance, but changed the form of service
provider and separated funding and provision.
We describe here the current UK set up. In each service, the reforms
created organisations responsible for the purchase of the service. These pur-
chasers are allocated tax funds on the basis of need (primarily demographic
characteristics). Purchasers buy the relevant service for all users who fall
within their geographical jurisdiction. They are not restricted in their choice
of supplier, introducing the incentive of competition for suppliers (in some
cases the suppliers can include the private sector).
3
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The previous monopoly suppliers were broken up into stand-alone entities
operating within the public sector. Their funding no longer comes directly
from the central ministry or local government, but is determined by contracts
won from purchasers. The importance of geographical access means this is
generally between a limited number of providers. Managers of suppliers have
been given greater control rights. Direct local political control of suppliers
has been reduced, and politicians stress that the responsibility for local ser-
vices rests with local purchasers and providers. But while management have
been given greater control rights over inputs, outputs, and pay, the owner-
ship of the suppliers’ physical assets remains in the public sector. Managers
are subject to central ministry scrutiny of investment decisions and control
on access to capital markets. Control over cash flows between financial years
is retained by central government. These public suppliers are not allowed
to carry forward savings between financial years without central ministry
approval and are generally required to break-even each year (Le Grand and
Bartlett 1993 and Propper 1996). These reforms therefore can be viewed as
similar to the corporatisation element of privatisation programmes: owner-
ship of the asset remains with the government, but managers have greater
control rights.
In all these services quality of service is important to the user, and in in-
troducing the quasi-market reforms, politicians in the UK stressed that one
aim is to increase the responsiveness of the service to the needs of users. Qual-
ity is also an aim of the producers of the service, as suppliers are composed of
groups of professionals (physicians, nurses, teachers) with professional norms
that stress quality.
In this paper we focus on the supply side of the quasi-market reforms. We
do not model the aims of purchasers; we assume their only role is to buy the
highest quality services using tax financed funds. Starting from a position of
no competition and political control rights (the departmental administration
form of service provision), a politician may introduce reform of the public
sector. This reform may either be to introduce competition and/or shift
control rights. Where competition is deemed to be possible, the politician
may choose either to give the managers control rights or to retain them. The
options open to the politician can be mapped into a 2x2 matrix of four cells.
These are given in Table 1. A traditional central government department is
in the no-competition, political control rights cell. Quasi-market reforms are
located in the competition, managerial control rights cell. The single agency
is in the no-competition, managerial control cell. Below we put forward a
4
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very specific definition of the political control rights-competition cell, but in
a more general framework this cell could be seen as competition between very
heavily regulated government providers.
3 The Model
The key players in the model are a politician (P) and two suppliers of services,
each run by a manager (M)1. All are risk neutral. The quality of service is not
verifiable (though it is observable). The politician selects the institutional
arrangements for service delivery that maximises his own utility.2
Each supplier has a capacity of one unit. The value of the supplier’s ser-
vice is stochastic and depends upon the unobservable effort of the manager.
The value is {
v with probability p (ei)
v with probability (1− p (ei))
where 0 ≤ v < v, and ei is the effort of the manager. Denote △v ≡ (v − v) .
The expected value of the service is then vi = v+p (ei)△v. c (ei) is the cost of
effort to the manager. We make standard assumptions about the probability
and cost functions.
Assumption 1. ei ∈ [0, E] where E > 0. p (0) ≥ 0 and p (E) < 1. p
′ (ei) >
0 and p′′ (ei) < 0. c (0) = 0. c
′ (ei) > 0 and c
′′ (ei) > 0 for ei ∈ (0, E)
with limei→0 c
′ (ei) = 0 and limei→E c
′ (ei) =∞.
The demand for the service is two units with probability λ and one unit
with probability (1−λ). This demand structure is a device to model competi-
tion for the suppliers rather than a treatment of stochastic demand at system
level. When demand is one unit there is Bertrand competition between the
suppliers, while when the demand is two units the suppliers do not compete
because a supplier can only produce one unit. λ is then the (inverse of) the
degree of competition. We assume that competition is not too tough: λ ≥ λ
where 0 < λ < 1.
1The two managers are identical ex ante, so in our exposition we do not explicitly
subscript the managers except where necessary.
2We assume monetary transfers (bribes) between politicians and managers are illegal
and unenforceable, so we do not examine joint surplus maximising structures.
5
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The politician (P) gets a noncontractible political benefit, P (v1 + v2) ,
which depends on the value of the service.3 We assume P is increasing in
(v1 + v2) , on the grounds that if the value is low the politician may lose the
next election. But the politician also has to raise taxes, T , to pay for the
services, which has a cost D (T ) . Part of the cost arises from distortions in
the economy caused by taxes while part is political: voters do not like high
taxes. We assume benefit and costs are such that
Assumption 2. P (v1 + v2) = ρ (v1 + v2) where ρ is positive. D (T ) ≥ 0.
D′ (T ) > 0 and D′′ (T ) > D where D > 0.
P has two choices: implement competition or not, delegate control rights
or not. This leads to four organisational structures: (i) no competition and
P control, (ii) no competition and M control, (iii) competition and P control
and (iv) competition and M control. To model the arms’ length nature of
competition within the public sector, we assume under competition P chooses
between suppliers, but cannot fire the manager except by not buying from
the supplier.4 Under no competition (the traditional bureaucratic hierarchy),
P controls the suppliers directly and has the right to fire the manager.
The benefits of P and M depend on whether they have the control rights.
The actors who have the control rights gets higher benefits from service
provision, on the grounds that they are seen by users (who are also voters)
as being more associated with service delivery. If P has the control rights his
political benefit from service delivery is P (v1 + v2) .Under managerial control
his political benefits are reduced to αPP (v1 + v2) , where 0 ≤ αP ≤ 1.
We also assume that M gets a private benefit from the value of the service.
M’s private benefit is B (vi) when M has control rights but is αMB (vi) , where
0 ≤ αM ≤ 1, when the control rights belong to the politician. We assume
that M’s private benefit is B (vi) = βvi where β > 0.
Both αP and αM are exogenous. We assume these parameters come from
information and reputation and reflect the fact that both P and M get less
credit if not fully associated with a project.
The agent with the control rights chooses the manager’s wages, wi. We
assume for simplicity that the outside wage for the manager is equal to zero.
3Our results are robust to alternative specification for political benefits
P (λ (v1 + v2) + (1− λ)max {v1, v2}) .
4This set up is intended to capture the impact of introducing competition by creating
a purchaser function. We do not analyse the role of the purchaser as it complicates the
analysis without adding insight.
6
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Given the above, the politician’s utility is
U =
{
ρ (v1 + v2)−D (T ) if P has control rights
αPρ (v1 + v2)−D (T ) if M has control rights
and the manager’s utility is:
UM =
{
βvi + wi − c (ei) if M has control rights
αMβvi + wi − c (ei) if P has control rights
The timing is as in Figure 1.
3.1 First best effort
We present as a benchmark the first-best level of effort. Political benefits
are not included in social welfare. When a politician wins an election social
welfare does not increase; but he simply gets the votes instead of another
politician. Similarly part of the cost of transfer D (T ) is political: the re-
maining social cost of transfer is d (T ) . First-best effort can be found from
Max
e1,e2,w1,w2
v1 + v2 + βv1 + βv2 − c (e1)− c (e2)− d (w1 + w2)
s.t. wi + βvi − c (ei) ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2.
The first-order condition is
(1 + β)∆vp′ (e∗i ) = c
′ (e∗i ) (1)
if and only if βvi (e
∗
i )− c (e
∗
i ) ≥ 0; otherwise,
(1 + β)∆vp′ (e∗i ) = c
′ (e∗i ) + d
′
(∑
c (e∗i )−
∑
βvi (e
∗
i )
)
. (2)
If private benefits are sufficient to motivate the manager to participate, social
welfare maximising effort is given by (1) . Then the marginal cost of effort
is set equal to the marginal benefit from higher value service and higher
private benefits. If the manager needs a monetary wage to motivate him to
participate, the first-best effort is given by (2) . Then the marginal social cost
of raising taxes to compensate the manager has to be included in costs.
7
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4 The Alternative Forms of Organisation
In this section we characterise each of the four forms of organisation that can
be chosen by the politician.
4.1 No Competition and Political Control
Effort and the value of service are noncontractible, so under no competition
there is nothing contractible to which incentives could be related. Thus ex-
ante contracts cannot provide incentives. Neither does ex-post bargaining,
since once effort is made its value is sunk. M can therefore be fired by P at
no cost and M will receive a zero payoff from ex-post bargaining. When the
suppliers do not compete, the manager chooses an effort level that maximises
his private benefit minus the effort cost
Max αMβvi − c (ei) .
The first-order condition gives the optimal effort level eNPi , where superscript
NP refers to no competition and political control:
αMβp
′
(
eNPi
)
∆v − c′
(
eNPi
)
= 0. (3)
Lemma 1 TNP = 0.
(3) is independent of wi.
There is no reason for P to pay wages to M since the wage does not
affect effort but increases the cost for P and, as M’s outside wage is zero, his
individual rationality constraint is satisfied for wi = 0. When P has control
rights he will choose a zero wage, and accordingly taxes are zero. P’s utility
is
UNP = ρ
∑
vi
(
eNPi
)
−D (0) . (4)
4.2 No Competition and Managerial Control
If M has the control rights, he would like to increase wi but where there is no
competition all the supplier’s income comes directly from P. P knows that M
would spend all the budget on wages and that this wage would not make M
8
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work any harder. Thus P gives M a zero budget. But as M receives a higher
private benefit when he has control rights his problem is to
Max βvi − c (ei) .
M’s effort is determined by
βpi
′
(
eNMi
)
∆v − c′
(
eNMi
)
= 0, (5)
where superscript NM refers to no competition and managerial control.
Comparing equations (3) and (5), eNMi ≥ e
NP
i . M exerts higher effort
when he has the control rights and gets the full credit from the quality.
Lemma 2 summarises this organisational form.
Lemma 2 (i) TNM = 0;
(ii) eNMi ≥ e
NP
i .
Under M control P does not get the full credit from the provision of the
service, and P’s utility is
UNM = αPρ
∑
vi
(
eNMi
)
−D (0) . (6)
4.3 Competition and Managerial Control
When the manager has control rights and there is competition, he chooses
wages and effort to maximise his own utility subject to a no-loss constraint:
Max wi + βvi − c (ei) s.t. Ri (ei, ej)− wi ≥ 0
where Ri (ei, ej) is the supplier’s expected revenues
5. Ri (ei, ej) are deter-
mined as follows:
Ri (ei, ej) = λ
1
2
vi + (1− λ) p (ei) (1− p (ej))∆v (7)
= λ
1
2
[v + p (ei)△v] + (1− λ) p (ei) (1− p (ej))∆v.
The derivation of revenues in (7) is as follows. With probability λ two units
are required, and there is no competition between the two managers (they
5Each manager runs only one supplier, so a supplier is synonymous with a manager.
9
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can each supply only one unit). Each deal is a separate bargain in which there
is a 50:50 split of the gross surplus. Each supplier’s profits are therefore 1
2
vi.
If only one unit is required then the managers compete. Bargaining is under
symmetric information (though the values are not verifiable), and therefore
we get an efficient outcome: the higher value service is provided. If only one
supplier Mi has a high value (which happens with probability pi (1− pj)),
then Mi wins the deal. P bargains with Mi and has an outside option to buy
the low-value service from Mj . Mj would be willing to offer a surplus up to v
to P. We assume that the quality difference is not too large (i.e. v ≧ v
2
), and
therefore P’s outside option is binding. This leads to a division of surplus
where P gets her outside option v and Mi gets the rest of the surplus ∆v. If
the service of both suppliers has the same value, all the surplus goes to P.6
When M has the right to choose his wages, he becomes a residual claimant.
M spends all the surplus on wages and the no loss constraint is always bind-
ing. Thus M chooses ei to
Max Ri (ei, ej) + βvi − c (ei) .
The Nash equilibrium in efforts
(
eCM1 , e
CM
2
)
is determined by the following
first order conditions. Superscript CM refers to competition and managerial
control:
∂Ri
(
eCMi , e
CM
j
)
∂ei
+ βp′
(
eCMi
)
∆v − c′
(
eCMi
)
= 0 i = 1, 2. (8)
Comparing (8) and (5) it follows that eCMi > e
NM
i ; competition provides
additional incentives for the manager. Higher effort not only increases private
benefits but also the monetary wage. These monetary incentives make M
work harder.7
6For example if both managers have high value, P is indifferent between the two. Say
P chooses to bargain with M1. P
′s outside option is to buy from M2 who is willing to
offer a surplus up to v to get the deal, so P has to get the same from the deal with M1:
in other words P receives all the surplus.
7Note that although M is the residual claimant, it does not follow that he undertakes
first-best effort. He chooses an effort level lower than first best since in the state where
demand is two units the value is shared 50:50 in bargaining. His effort level may have
even less to do with the level P would prefer. P is not a social welfare maximiser and may
wish to implement a higher or lower level of effort.
10
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The transfers are equal to the sum of the suppliers’ revenues T =
∑
Ri (ei, ej) .
P has to raise taxes to pay for the services, and how much he has to pay is
determined by competition between the suppliers.
Lemma 3 states the main results for competition and managerial control.
Lemma 3 (i) TCM =
∑
Ri
(
eCMi , e
CM
j
)
;
(ii) eCMi > e
NM
i .
P’s utility is
UCM = αPρ
∑
vi
(
eCMi
)
−D
(∑
Ri
(
eCMi , e
CM
j
))
. (9)
Relative to no competition the value of the service is higher, but so are the
transfers.
4.4 Competition and Political Control
Under political control P designs an incentive scheme for M. P does not,
however, directly pay the wage; instead it is paid from the revenues received
by the supplier. Competition creates verifiable revenues on which P can base
the incentive scheme. P can implement any effort level that satisfies the
individual rationality constraint
Ri (ei, ej) + αMβvi − c (ei) ≥ 0. (10)
This can be done by a simple linear incentive scheme or by more complex
incentive schemes. We concentrate our analysis on the maximum effort level
that P can implement, which is given by the maximal solution to
Ri (ei, ej) + αMβvi − c (ei) = 0. (11)
Lemma 4 sums up the outcome of this institution.
Lemma 4 (i) The highest effort P can implement, eCPi > 0, is given by[
Ri
(
eCPi , e
CP
j
)
+ αMβv
CP
i − c
(
eCPi
)]
= 0;
(ii) TCP =
∑
Ri
(
eCPi , e
CP
j
)
.
P’s utility is
UCP = ρ
∑
vi
(
eCPi
)
−D
(∑
Ri
(
eCPi , e
CP
j
))
.
11
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5 Optimal Organisation
P chooses an organisation that maximises his utility. We first compare the
organisational forms with respect to the level of effort. We know from Lem-
mas 2 and 3 that eNPi ≤ e
NM
i < e
CM
i . Starting from politician control and
no competition, delegating first control rights to the manager increases effort
because, for given value of service, M’s private benefit is greater when he is
in control. Introducing competition further increases effort because higher
effort increases suppliers’ revenues and, therefore, M can pay himself a higher
wage.
Comparison of effort under competition and P control is not as straight-
forward. Any effort level that satisfies the individual rationality constraint
(10) can be implemented under P control and competition, while the in-
centive compatibility constraint determines the effort levels under the other
organisational forms.
First, eCPi is higher than e
NP
i since e
NP
i = argmax [αMβvi − c (ei)] while
the maximum effort that can be implemented under competition and political
control is given by
[
Ri
(
eCPi , e
CP
j
)
+ αMβv
CP
i − c
(
eCPi
)]
= 0. Effort that
equates M’s private benefit under P control to his costs, αMβvi = c (ei) , (i.e.
ignoring the revenue term) is already higher than eNPi , which equates the
marginal private benefit to marginal cost.
Second, compare eCPi and e
CM
i . When αM → 0 and managerial private
benefits are important (β is high) , eCMi > e
CP
i since e
CM
i = argmax [Ri (ei, ej) + βvi − c (ei)] .
Then managerial private benefits have a significant effect on eCMi but no ef-
fect on eCPi , while when αM → 1 P can implement e
CM
i under competition
and political control as M’s private benefits do not depend on who has control
rights.
Turning to a comparison of the level of transfers, under no competition
transfers are zero and P does not have to raise any taxes. With competition
P has to raise taxes equal to the two suppliers’ revenues.
P will choose the organisational form that maximises his own utility,
which depends both on the value of service (and effort) and on transfers. We
can find the optimal organisation by pairwise comparisons.
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5.1 Decentralisation
We first analyse decentralisation: whether or not to give control rights to the
manager. P will not delegate control rights under no competition if and only
if
ρ
∑
vi
(
eNPi
)
≥ αPρ
∑
vi
(
eNMi
)
. (12)
Under no competition transfers are equal to zero: the choice of organisa-
tion depends only on the political benefits. The value of the service is higher
under M control
(
eNMi ≥ e
NP
i
)
, but P does not get the full credit for it.
When αP
αM
is low P’s utility is higher when he keeps the control rights. High
αM means that M’s effort is not much lower under P control while low αP
means that P does not get enough credit for the higher value service under
M control to make delegation worthwhile. Conversely, for high αP
αM
P will
delegate as he gets enough credit for the significantly higher value service
under M control.
For the decentralisation decision under competition, P keeps the control
rights if and only if
ρ
∑
vi
(
eCPi
)
−D
(∑
Ri
(
eCPi , e
CP
j
))
≥ αPρ
∑
vi
(
eCMi
)
−D
(∑
Ri
(
eCMi , e
CM
j
))
.
(13)
The analysis is more complex than in the no competition case, but the re-
sult is the same: P keeps the control rights when αP
αM
is low and delegates
otherwise, just as under no competition.
Proposition 1 The higher is αP
αM
the more beneficial it is to the politician
to delegate control rights to the managers (i.e. to decentralise).
Proof. Available on JEBP website
αP
αM
is one of the key forces in our model. It can be seen as a measure
of the loss from devolving decision making to the manager: the higher this
ratio, the lower the loss to the politician of managerial control. When this
relative loss from delegation is low the politician will delegate control rights
to the managers.
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5.2 Competition
We now consider the decision whether to introduce competition. Competi-
tion increases the value of the service, as eCPi > e
NP
i and e
CM
i > e
NM
i , but
also increases taxes. P will introduce competition when the higher political
benefits outweigh the higher political costs. Under P control competition
dominates if and only if
ρ
[∑
vi
(
eCPi
)
−
∑
vi
(
eNPi
)]
≥ D
(∑
Ri
(
eCPi , e
CP
j
))
. (14)
Under M control P introduces competition if and only if
αPρ
[∑
vi
(
eCMi
)
−
∑
vi
(
eNMi
)]
≥ D
(∑
Ri
(
eCMi , e
CM
j
))
. (15)
P would never introduce competition if his utility were maximised with
either eNPi or e
NM
i (the efforts that are achievable at no cost under no compe-
tition). P can implement a higher level of effort under competition, but that
will increase the political costs as well. Accordingly, competition dominates
when political benefits are high relative to political costs (D(·)
P (·)
is low). This
is true whoever has the control rights. It is also true where competition and
M control is dominated8 and P compares CP and NM:
ρ
[∑
vi
(
eCPi
)
− αP
∑
vi
(
eNMi
)]
≥ D
(∑
Ri
(
eCPi , e
CP
j
))
. (16)
This gives our second Proposition.
Proposition 2 The lower is D(·)
P (·)
, the more beneficial it is to the politician
to introduce competition.
This key term can be given the following interpretation. Governments
raise taxes to supply a number of services. At any one time, these services
may differ in popularity. So, for example, the provision of health and edu-
cation services by government often has considerable political support, while
the provision of social security is viewed as a necessary but unpopular gov-
ernment activity. Provision of the first type of services may give politicians
8If eCMi < e
CP
i (which holds for αM large), P can get a higher value service under his
control and get all the credit from it. Then CM is dominated by CP.
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greater benefit than provision of the second type, whilst raising taxes for
unpopular services may be more costly for a politician. D(·)
P (·)
can thus be seen
as a measure of the relative unpopularity of the service: the higher this ratio
the less popular the service. With this interpretation we have a result for
optimal form of organisation for services of different popularity. The politi-
cian is less likely to choose competition for unpopular services as competition
is associated with higher transfer, but more likely to introduce competition
for popular services.
5.3 Interaction of Decentralisation and Competition
P delegates control rights when αP
αM
is high and introduces competition when
D(·)
P (·)
is low. We now analyse the interaction of competition and control rights.
How does the popularity of the service affect the decentralisation decision,
and how does the loss from devolving decision making to the manager affect
P’s choice to introduce competition. To answer these questions we have to
locate the boundary between the different organisational forms.
First, the boundary between M and P control with no competition is
defined by
ρ
[∑
vi
(
eNPi
)
− αP
∑
vi
(
eNMi
)]
= 0. (17)
Since (17) is linear in ρ, ρ has no effect on the boundary. On the boundary
higher political benefits increase P’s utility equally under P and M control.
P’s decision to delegate control rights under no competition depends only on
αP
αM
. This is depicted by the vertical boundary between NP and NM in Figure
2.
Second, consider the boundary between M and P control under competi-
tion:
ρ
[
αP
∑
vi
(
eCMi
)
−
∑
vi
(
eCPi
)]
= D
(∑
Ri
(
eCMi , e
CM
j
))
−D
(∑
Ri
(
eCPi , e
CP
j
))
> 0.
(18)
First, this boundary exists only if αM is small enough since only then is
eCMi > e
CP
i . Since P only would delegate control rights if there were no other
way to motivate the manager to higher effort, it follows that on the boundary
15
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both political benefits and costs are higher under M control. Then consider
the effect of higher political benefits on the boundary. Differentiating the
left-hand-side of (18) with respect to ρ we obtain
αP
∑
vi
(
eCMi
)
−
∑
vi
(
eCPi
)
> 0. (19)
(19) is positive from equation (18) . Political benefits increase more under
managerial control. Since political costs do not depend on ρ, increasing ρ
makes managerial control strictly better. Therefore the more popular the
service is, the lower is the critical value of αP
αM
that makes decentralisation
optimal for P.
In summary, the boundary between political and managerial control is
vertical under no competition: once D(·)
P (·)
is high enough, there is no trade-off
between service popularity and delegation of control rights. Under competi-
tion (where D(·)
P (·)
is lower) a trade-off exists. This upward sloping boundary
between politician control rights and managerial control rights under compe-
tition can be interpreted as follows. If a service is very popular, the politician
will be willing to give up political control rights in order to increase manage-
rial effort and the value of the service. This is because the cost of raising
taxes for this service is low relative to the benefits derived from the effort.
Now consider the boundary between competition and no competition. We
know that competition will be introduced for low D(·)
P (·)
. How does this decision
depend on αP
αM
? Under P control the boundary is defined by
ρ
[∑
vi
(
eCPi
)
−
∑
vi
(
eNPi
)]
= D
(∑
Ri
(
eCPi , e
CP
j
))
. (20)
As P has the control rights this comparison does not depend on the parameter
αP . Both e
NP
i and e
CP
i are increasing in αM : e
NP
i because M’s marginal
private benefit increases and eCPi because the individual rationality constraint
is relaxed. However, it is ambiguous which effort increases more. We have
drawn Figure 2 assuming this boundary is increasing.9
Finally, we analyse the boundary between competition and no competi-
tion under managerial control. The two regimes give the same utility for P
when
αPρ
[∑
v
(
eCMi
)
−
∑
v
(
eNMi
)]
= D
(∑
R
(
eCMi
))
(21)
9With the specific functional forms introduced in Section 6, the CP-NP boundary is
increasing when competition effect is high.
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holds. Since M has the control rights this expression does not depend on αM .
Differentiating the left-hand-side of (21) with respect to αP we obtain
ρ
[∑
v
(
eCMi
)
−
∑
v
(
eNMi
)]
> 0. (22)
Equation (22) is positive since eCMi > e
NM
i . Therefore starting from the
boundary and increasing αP
αM
makes competition strictly better for P. To re-
store equality requires higher D(·)
P (·)
. The lower the loss from devolving decision
making to the manager, the less popular can the service be and competition
can still be introduced.
Figure 2 summarises the results. The trade-offs between the two forces
can be seen in the boundaries between the various types of organisation. In
Figure 2 the boundary between competition and no competition is increasing
in αP
αM
and D(·)
P (·)
, indicating that the tendency to switch to no-competition
as D(·)
P (·)
increases can be offset by a fall in the loss from devolving decision
making to the manager. Put another way, the lower the loss from delegation
of control rights, the greater the unpopularity of the service may be under
competition.
6 Manager’s Private Benefits
We have shown the importance of the key parameters, αP
αM
and D(·)
P (·)
, in deter-
mining the choice of organisation. In this section we analyse how an increase
in the manager’s private benefit, β, changes the optimal organisational form.
We introduce the following specific functional forms to undertake this anal-
ysis: p (ei) = pei, c (ei) =
1
2
e2i and D (T ) = T
γ where γ ≥ γ and γ > 1.
6.1 Competition
We first analyse how an increase in β affects P’s decision to introduce com-
petition. Each boundary is examined in detail in the Appendix, and we draw
our results together here.
One would expect that competition becomes less likely as private benefits
on their own motivate more. It is not necessary for P to introduce costly
competition to improve the value of the service when private benefits alone
motivate more. However, we show that the effect of higher managerial private
17
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benefits is more subtle: competition can actually become more likely on some
parts of the boundary between competition and no competition.
We first examine the effect of higher β on the CM-NM boundary. When
M’s marginal private benefit increases, M exerts more effort. But under
competition this effect is dampened by the fact that the rival supplier’s
effort is also increased, reducing the marginal monetary return to effort
(∂2R/∂ei∂ej < 0). This is why M’s effort is more responsive to higher rivate
benefits under no competition, and accordingly the CM-NM boundary shifts
in favour of NM. In other words, competition becomes less likely.
The CP-NP (or CP-NM) boundary can move either way. Under CP
organisation, P implements an effort level that equates the supplier’s revenues
plus M’s private benefits to M’s effort costs. When β increases, M’s private
benefits increase for a given effort level, and P can then push for higher
effort, without violating the individual rationality constraint. But this effect
as well is dampened by the rival supplier’s increased effort which reduces
the supplier’s revenues. This ”competition effect” is ∂Ri
∂ej
= − (1− λ) p2∆vei.
Our analysis shows that the effect of an increase in β depends importantly
on whether
(1− λ) p2∆v ≥
1
2
(23)
holds or not. This competition effect depends on three features of our model.
The first is the probability that the suppliers actually compete, (1− λ) . The
second is the size of the the winner’s surplus under competition, ∆v.10 The
third is the probability with which effort translates into higher quality, p, as
the extent to which the rival’s higher effort reduces the probability that the
supplier is the only supplier with high quality depends on p.
When (23) holds, the competition effect is large and effort increases rel-
atively little under CP as a response to higher β. Then M’s effort is more
responsive to β under no competition and competition becomes less likely,
just as on the CM-NM boundary. Part (i) of the following Proposition states
this result.
Proposition 3 When β increases
(i) competition becomes less likely if (1− λ) p2∆v ≥ 1
2
, and
10The only case when the supplier earns positive revenues under competition is when
there is one supplier with high quality service and another with low quality service.
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(ii) CP becomes more likely if (1− λ) p2∆v < αM
αP
− 1
2
and ρ is high enough
on the CP boundary.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Part (ii) of Proposition 3 gives the surprising result. When private ben-
efits increase, M provides a higher quality service under no competition at
no cost to the politician. But quality increases more under competition (if
the competition effect is low11) and although also the political costs increase
(while they remain zero under no competition), the dominant effect is the
higher political benefits under CP (when ρ is high enough). This is the case
where P is more likely to introduce competition when β increases.
6.2 Decentralisation
We will now examine how an increase in β affects P’s decision to decentralise
control rights. One might think that since M’s control rights are related to
his private benefits, higher private benefits would make delegation a better
instrument for increasing the value of the service. However, our results show
that higher β does not necessarily lead to more decentralisation. Under no
competition β does not have any effect on P’s decision to delegate, while
under competition the effect can go either way. Our results are given in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 4 When β increases
(i) the NM-NP boundary does not shift, and
(ii) managerial control becomes more likely on the CM-CP boundary if
and only if αP
αM
>
2[(1−λ)p2∆v+1]
2(1−λ)p2∆v+1
and ρ is high enough on the boundary.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Under no competition P’s decision to decentralise does not depend at
all on M’s private benefits. Although the effort increases more under NM
11Proposition 3 (ii) also requires αP
αM
to be low enough. This is because when we compare
CP and NM the control rights also differ. When αP is low political benefits do not increase
much under NM since P does not get much credit for the better service. For high αM
effort responds a lot to higher private benefits under CP since the private benefits are a
significant motivator for M even under P control. Furthermore P gets all the credit for
the improved service. Therefore the political benefits increase more under CP compared
to NM when αP
αM
– and (1− λ) p2∆v – are low.
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(∂e
NP
∂β
< ∂e
NM
∂β
) P gets less credit from it. These two effects cancel out on the
NM-NP boundary.
Under competition, managerial control becomes more likely if the loss
from devolving decision making is small enough and the political benefits are
high enough. First, political benefits increase more under CM if αP
αM
is high.
If αM is low, effort does not respond much to higher private benefits under
CP because private benefits are not a significant motivator, and if αP is high,
P gets enough credit for the value improvement under CM and accordingly
political benefits increase more under CM. Second, political costs increase
more under CM, 12 but when ρ is high enough, political benefits increase
more than the political costs and P is more likely to delegate control rights
when β increases.
However it is also possible that higher private benefits result in less dele-
gation. This is the case when the greater increase in the value of the service
under M control is politically too costly (ρ is low). Alternatively, when
αP
αM
is low, effort and the value of the service increases less under M control.
This is because when αM is high, private benefits motivate well even under
P control and effort actually increases more under CP. Then P is less likely
to delegate control rights when β increases.
This analysis shows that what drives our model are the two key ratios, ρ
(which, in turn, determines D(·)
P (·)
) and αP
αM
, and the competition effect. This
section also shows that the results can be quite subtle. While the intuition
behind D(·)
P (·)
and αP
αM
is straightforward, our results show that what might
seem obvious (that increasing the private benefit managers get from service
provision should reduce the need for competition) does not necessarily hold.
Neither is it always true that higher private benefits make delegation more
powerful but the effect can go either way, or there is even no effect (under
no competition). This complexity of the model also extends to analysis of
other key parameters; for example, the gap in quality between a low and a
high quality supplier.
12This is because eCMi > e
CP
i on the CM-CP boundary (as P would not delegate control
rights if he could achieve the same effort level under his control). Since the political costs
are convex, marginal political cost is higher under CM. Furthermore
∂eCMi
∂β
>
∂eCPi
∂β
as
explained above. Therefore the political costs clearly increase more under CM when β
increases.
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7 Conclusion
This paper examines politician choice of organisational form for government
services where the service remains government funded but the politician has
the choice of delegation of control rights to managers and the introduction
of competition in supply. We analyse the case of a service that has an ob-
servable but non-contractible value for the end users and for which both
the producer of the service and the politician derive additional, also non-
contractible, private benefits from its production. We show that the choice
of organisational form will depend upon two ratios. The first is the ratio of
political benefit of service provision to the political cost of raising taxes. The
second is the ratio of political benefit lost under managerial control rights to
managerial private benefits lost under politician control rights. Where the
former is low, the politician is less likely to introduce competition. Where
the latter is high, the politician is more likely to delegate control rights to a
manager. Further, these factors are not independent. At the margin there
is a trade-off between these two forces, which means that the politician may
choose to have managerial control under competition with a higher loss from
delegation than under no competition. While these factors are intuitive, our
analysis also shows that delegation is not always optimal when the supplier
gets more private benefit from service provision, and competition may be in-
troduced even when managers have strong private incentives to supply high
quality services.
Our emphasis on the politician as self-interested as distinct from a social
welfare maximiser seems to us to be helpful in understanding why changes
in organisational form of the public sector arise. One corollary of our model
is that services that are ’popular’ are more likely to be produced under com-
petition, and the smaller the political loss from delegation of control rights,
the more likely is managerial control. We would therefore expect to see the
introduction of internal markets in services that are ’popular’ and for which
the costs of not giving managers control right is high. On the other hand,
we would expect to see a single agency rather than competition where ser-
vices are less popular, and there are similar political losses from delegation
of control rights. This appears to mirror the patterns in recent UK welfare
state reform. Services in which professionals play a large role in service de-
livery (for which managerial control may be seen to have large advantages)
have been associated with a movement of control rights from politicians to
managers. Competition has been introduced in those services that receive
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relatively high political support (for example, education and health), whilst
those where the general level of political support is lower have been devolved
to free standing but non-competing public sector agencies (for example, the
Child Support Agency or the Highways Agency).
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Table 1
Competition No competition
Managerial Control
Rights
Quasi-markets Single agency
Politician Control Rights Central government
department
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P chooses
organisation
Agent with control
rights chooses wi
Managers
choose effort
State of world realised:
the value of service and
the state of demand
Delivery of service,
private benefits for
M and P realised,
P’s costs realised
Figure 1: Time line
Figure 2: Optimal form of organisation
NP
CP
NM
CM
D(.)/P(.)
N = no competition, C = competition, P= politician control rights, M = managerial 
control rights
αP/αM
Figure(s)
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